Global defence spending: What next for European military procurement?

With its fragmented production process, European defence procurement is inefficient and uncompetitive in comparison to the United States. A new approach, prioritising cross-country collaborations, could improve things, but would not be without its own challenges.

Introduced in March 2024, the European Defence Industrial Strategy (EDIS) forms the centrepiece of European Defence Industrial Policy. The strategy aims to strengthen the competitiveness and readiness of the European Defence Technology and Industrial Base (EDTIB) through greater inter-state collaboration.

It includes some ambitious targets, all of which are designed to allocate more resources to the EDTIB. For example, by 2030 the goal is for 50% of defence procurement budgets and at least 40% of defence equipment procurement to come through collaboration. There is also a designated €1.5 billion budget for European defence industry ‘readiness’.

The background to all of this is British and European rearmament (readiness), largely in response to the increasing threat of Russia (following its acquisition of Crimea and its illegal military operations in Ukraine). European defence spending increased from €343 billion in 2024 to €381 billion in 2025.

Figure 1 shows 2024 defence spending as a share of gross domestic product (GDP) by European country. Taking 2% as a target, Italy, Spain and Portugal are below the threshold. Poland – which shares a border with war-torn Ukraine – spent more than double the target last year, at 4.15%. At the same time, last year Russia spent an estimated 7.05% of its GDP on ‘defence’.

Figure 1. European defence spending as a share of GDP, 2024

Source: NATO & SIPRI
Note: NATO members have agreed a new benchmark for defence spending, targeting 5% of GDP by 2035.

How do inefficiencies in the European defence market affect spending?

Inefficiencies within the European defence market shape spending patterns. For example, there are cases of duplication of defence R&D, fragmented national defence markets, ‘off-the-shelf’ procurement from non-EU suppliers, and a general failure to exploit economies of scale and learning. Compared with the US market, for instance, Europe is neither efficient nor competitive.

This inefficiency is reflected in Europe producing three different types of combat aircraft: the Eurofighter Typhoon, the French Rafale and the Swedish Gripen. Each type supplies national and export markets: 782 Typhoons, 710 Rafales, and 369 Gripen aircraft had been ordered or delivered as of October 2025.

So, if each European nation had agreed to buy one type of combat aircraft, total output would have been around 1,800 units. Common procurement would also have reduced production costs by an estimated 10-20%. In contrast, the American F-35 combat aircraft has a total planned output of 3,556 units – almost twice the total for Europe.

What about sixth-generation aircraft?

The sixth-generation fighter aircraft market already looks highly competitive. By 2027, Europe plans to build the Future Combat Aircraft System (FCAS), with France, Germany and Spain all taking part in the project. At the same time, the UK is developing the Tempest combat aircraft jointly with Italy and Japan, with the first flight also due in 2027.

Meanwhile, across the pond, in March 2025, the United States announced that Boeing would be developing the F-47 Next Generation Air Dominance (NGAD) fighter. It is designed to replace the F-22 aircraft, with the first flight planned in 2028. There have already been 185 orders.

For public policy purposes, there are questions as to whether Europe can afford to fund two similar combat aircraft projects. In one sense, the answer must be that Europe and the UK can afford to pay the price of having two separate independent developments. Even so, there are other policy options (with differing costs). On one hand, European countries could collaborate further and undertake the project with great cost-sharing. On the other hand, they could simply buy American aircraft.

Further collaboration is economically and politically attractive. Economically, more nations joining a project would lead to greater sharing regarding R&D and the pooling of production orders. But this assumes all else remains unchanged – which is unlikely. Further collaboration is costly, as each partner nation demands its share of high technology on the project – namely, a share of the advances in airframe, engine and avionics (aviation-specific electronics), and duplicate flight test centres. Similarly, partners will each demand a share of the production work, leading to duplicate final assembly lines and adding to total costs (although these could still be less than a national-level initiative would cost).

At the same time, and perhaps most importantly, more collaborative partnerships could lead to cost sharing and cost savings. This is likely to mean lower prices for each partner nation compared with an independent, single-nation solution.

But problems can also come from further collaboration. The number of partner nations will rise from three to six, increasing transaction costs. More difficult will be the process of selecting the ‘winning project’ and the inevitable ‘national champion’ – namely, a choice between BAE Systems in the UK and Dassault of France. In an ideal world, sharing design work between two world-class firms should produce an outstanding design. But in reality, the outcome is likely to be a compromise, with equal sharing of development work on the aircraft, which might not be an efficient solution. Even so, some inefficiencies are the price of further collaboration.

An alternative solution would be for European governments to buy American units. The options here are to buy off-the-shelf, either completely or with some form of ‘offset’ (a type ofcompensation arrangement made between a supplier and the purchasing government) offerning varying amounts of work to the importing nation. Again, these options involve different benefits and costs. For example, direct imports involve foreign currency payments while an offset provides some jobs and the retention of domestic industrial capability for the importing nation. Another possibility is a negotiation similar to the F-35, where the UK was a ‘level 1 partner’ with a 15% share of the programme. A similar deal might be negotiated for the purchase of the US F-47, with the UK enjoying similar benefits.

Where next in an ideal world for European defence?

European defence industrial policy must address the choice of the next-generation combat aircraft. A simple solution would be to continue with the FCAS and UK-led Tempest projects as separate independent ventures. But the new EDIS framework, with its commitment to European solutions, suggests a better option would be to seek a new collaboration between the FCAS and Tempest. These seem like similar aircraft, and creating a new collaboration involving six partner nations could be beneficial.

Such a collaboration would offer cost savings in both R&D and production. Fixed R&D costs would be shared between six nations rather than three, and production orders would be considerably increased (possibly even doubled). This could allow for further economies of scale and learning, and at least a 10% unit cost savings (PwC, 2021; Mueller, 2025). Indeed, production numbers for the FCAS have been estimated at 200-300 units and a merger with the Tempest could double this to 400-600 units (Mueller, 2025).

There would, however, still be transaction costs associated with the six-part collaboration. This is not a unique problem. For example, the Airbus Atlas military transport aircraft is a seven-nation collaboration, and the Eurofighter Typhoon involves four partner countries.

Conclusion

A possible merger between the FCAS and Tempest programmes might be a way forward for both projects. It would create a large military-industrial-political complex whose true economic benefits and costs would still need to be assessed. It would also be a centrepiece of the new European defence industrial policy, and might attract new export customers from the European Union (EU) and elsewhere.

A more ambitious target is the formation of a European Army, Navy and Air Force. But this would require a single European decision-making mechanism replacing the current arrangement of individual European Member States. It would allow common procurement policies and large-scale purchasing for land, sea and air weapons. This is certainly a long run dream but could be one worth pursuing. Removing the inefficiencies in European defence markets described above by creating a single European market for defence equipment could create substantial gains, both economically and in terms of security.