Competing economic perspectives \u2013 primarily on whether Scotland would be better or worse off without the rest of the UK \u2013 have formed the backdrop to debates on Scotland\u2019s constitutional future.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Since the electoral breakthrough of the Scottish National Party (SNP) during the 1960s, the dichotomy between \u2018rich Scots or poor Britons\u2019 has been a dominant theme in the argument for independence (Cameron, 2012<\/a>). On the other hand, opponents of Scottish independence have emphasised the economic benefits of the Union through access to a large national market, currency stability and net benefits arising from public spending (known as fiscal transfers).<\/p>\n\n\n\n Economic historians are increasingly emphasising the centrality of deindustrialisation \u2013 the decline in the significance of industrial activities in Scotland\u2019s economy and especially in employment \u2013 as a dominant driver of dissatisfaction with the Union since the mid-20th<\/sup> century. It was at this time that Scotland\u2019s staple industries of coal, steel, shipbuilding, heavy engineering and textiles began shedding tens of thousands of jobs (Phillips, 2017<\/a>).<\/p>\n\n\n\n It was against this backdrop that long-term assessments of the benefits and costs of the Union were developed \u2013 such as Clive Lee\u2019s<\/a> 1995 \u2018balance sheet\u2019 study of Scotland in the 20th<\/sup> century, which emphasised that the declining Union dividend was important in shaping growing support for independence. This can be understood in a global context where deindustrialisation has often been seen as a key explanation of political turbulence.<\/p>\n\n\n\n